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If it is true that in the beginning was the word, then almost from the beginning there 
was  a  problem  of  translation.  Or  rather:  there  is  in  that  beginning  a  problem  of 
translation; it is still here, in this beginning, in the very word which was there when I 
began.
I am of course referring to the Biblical word, the notorious crux in the opening 
sentence of the Gospel according to Saint John, ‘In the beginning was the Word’, -
although in fact the word that was there in the beginning was ‘logos’, as the text was 
in Greek. A facile remark, I know, but useful as a reminder. We are only too ready to 
overlook translation, even when it is staring us in the face. We easily forget just how 
much translation has gone into the making of our culture. 
Perhaps, though, ‘logos’ was not at first such a problem, at least not for the early 
Bible translators. Saint Jerome, after all, gave us the straight ‘verbum’ in the Latin 
version that became known as the Vulgate; and in the Latin-speaking Western church Jerome’s Vulgate remained unchallenged for a thousand years. Until Erasmus, that is. 
Erasmus - probably the most famous Dutchman ever, perhaps because he never wrote 
a word of Dutch - pulled the rug from under Jerome’s feet by arguing, at great and 
persuasive length, that the Latin ‘sermo’, ‘speech’, translated the Greek ‘logos’ more 
adequately than Jerome’s ‘verbum’. And because Erasmus’s ‘castigatio’, as he called 
it, faulted Jerome on a substantial number of such translational choices, his edition 
and  profusely  annotated  translation  of  the  New  Testament  in  1516  decisively 
undermined the authority of the Vulgate in the Western Church. Luther, as we know, 
would be the first to make use of Erasmus’s New Testament for his own version.
But there is another beginning that draws on ‘logos’ and is thereby drawn into the 
problem of translation. This takes us back to Aristotle, but let me make my approach 
with the help of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Being a hermeneuticist, Gadamer is very much 
alive to questions of meaning and interpretation. In an essay from 1966, ‘Man and 
Language’ - an essay which, appropriately, in view of its title, begins and ends with 
issues of translation - Gadamer takes up Aristotle’s classic definition of man as a 
being  that  has  ‘logos’.  Rather  than  the  usual  rendering  which  defines  man  as  a 
‘rational  being’,  translating  ‘logos’  as  ‘reason’  or  ‘thought’,  Gadamer  prefers  to 
understand  -  and  therefore  to  translate  -  ‘logos’  as ‘language’. Man is not only a 
rational being but also, perhaps even primarily, a language animal. Gadamer’s point is 
that man’s distinguishing feature consists in the capacity to communicate beyond the 
sphere  of  the  immediately  given,  for  example  by  referring  to  general  or  abstract 
concepts, or to the future. Through language man can make manifest that which is not 
immediately  present  to  the  senses.  This  allows  complex  social  organisation  and 
culture, so that ‘logos’ extends into notions like ‘concept’ and ‘law’.
Hermeneutics and, with it, translation, are now just around the corner. To the 
extent  that  language  facilitates  human  interaction  and  fixes  forms  of  cultural 
expression more or less permanently, it requires interpretation, time and again. And as 
Gadamer  reminds  us  in  a  couple  of  other  essays  from  the  1960s,  ‘[h]ermeneutics 
operates wherever what is said is not immediately intelligible’. This operation takes 
place in the first instance within the same tradition, when the accidents of time and 
change have erected obstacles to the transmission of linguistic meaning in written 
texts that have come to look distant, alien. Crucially, the process involves a form of 
translation.  Hence,  as  Gadamer  put  it,  ‘[f]rom  the  structure  of  translation  was 
indicated the general problem of making what is alien our own’. How this process 
works  in  practice  within  one  and  the  same  linguistic  and  cultural  tradition  is 
illustrated in the opening chapter of George Steiner’s After Babel. The chapter, which 
deals  with  the  kind  of  deciphering  required  in  making  sense  of  the  language  of 
English writers from Shakespeare to Noel Coward, is suitably entitled ’Understanding 
as Translation’.
Once we have reached this point, the point where we understand ‘understanding’ 
as ‘translation’, we can broaden our scope. In fact we can broaden it so much that it is 
hard to see where the end might be. Translation then very nearly becomes the human 
condition. Every act of understanding involves an act of translation of one kind or 
another.  It  is  tempting  to  call  here  on  modern  philosophers,  Jacques  Derrida,  for 
example, speaking about ‘the redoubtable, irreducible difficulty of translation’: ‘With 
the problem of translation we will be dealing with nothing less than the problem of 
the passage into philosophy’; or Donald Davidson: ‘Studying the criteria of translation 
is therefore a way of focusing on criteria of identity for conceptual schemes’.  This is 
not the road I want to take, if only because I am not a philosopher, not even much of a 
hermeneuticist, come to that.
Yet I want to stay with Gadamer for just one moment. Hermeneutics may initially have envisaged its endeavours as taking place within one and the same cultural and 
linguistic tradition, but to the extent that its general thrust, its ‘problem of making 
what  is  alien  our  own’  resembles  the  structure  of  translation,  it  is  certainly  not 
confined to monolingual operations. The alien is alien because it is, for all practical 
purposes, part of an alien world, a foreign language. Let me quote Gadamer again, 
speaking  about  hermeneutics  as  the  transmission,  the  trans-lation,  of  lost  or 
inaccessible meaning:
As the art of conveying what is said in a foreign language to the understanding of 
another  person,  hermeneutics  is  not  without  reason  named  after  Hermes,  the 
interpreter of the divine message to mankind. If we recall the origin of the name 
hermeneutics, it becomes clear that we are dealing here with a language event, 
with a translation from one language to another, and therefore with the relation of 
two languages.
What becomes clear from this is that the model of hermeneutics is translation in its 
conventional sense, i.e. translation between languages.  The gods speak a different 
language from ours, therefore Hermes has to mediate and interpret between them and 
us. Human communities too speak in mutually unintelligible tongues. In the end it 
does  not  really  matter  whether  we  think  of  this  unintelligibility  as  extending 
diachronically  within  one  linguistic  and  cultural  tradition,  with  language  change 
erecting  the  barrier  over  time,  or  as  being  spread,  synchronically,  over  a  certain 
geographical space, with different languages being spoken side by side. Man may be a 
language animal, but he is never a language animal in a general or abstract sense. We 
always  inhabit  a  specific  language.  More  than  that:  unless  we  find  ways  of 
overcoming the limits of our particular language, we remain imprisoned in it.
The shadow that falls over a statement like this is, of course, that of Babel, of the 
multiplicity and confusion of tongues. And it is entirely appropriate, as indeed Derrida 
has exquisitely reminded us, that ‘Babel’ itself, like ‘logos’, is a word that defies 
translation. If Babel spread linguistic confusion and thereby necessitated translation, it 
also rendered translation profoundly problematical, beginning with the word ‘Babel’ 
itself, which is both a proper name and a common noun meaning precisely ‘confusion’ 
- even though there appears to be some confusion as to whether, or to what extent, it 
really  does  mean  ‘confusion’.  And  if  understanding  is  translation,  surely  Babel 
confounds not only the translator but the hermeneuticist as well.
Be that as it may, and before leaving hermeneutics to sort out its own problems 
with Babel, let me retrieve from the hermeneutic endeavour two aspects that are of 
particular relevance to translation, or at least to translation as we commonly perceive 
it.  The  first  is  that  of  cultural  transmission  and  retrieval,  the  second  that  of 
interpretation  as  making  intelligible  to others by means of verbal explanation and 
gloss.
The first, transmission and retrieval, points to the translator as enabler, as one who 
provides  access  by  removing  barriers,  by  leading  across  the  chasms  that  prevent 
understanding. The second, making intelligible, points to how the enabling and the 
provision  of  access  is  achieved:  by  offering  a  mirror  image  of  that  which  itself 
remains beyond reach, by presenting a reproduction, a replica, a representation. The 
first  generates  the  metaphor  of  translation  as  building  bridges,  or  as  ferrying  or 
carrying across, as ‘trans-latio’, as ‘meta-phor’. The second appeals to translation as 
resemblance, as likeness, as imitation, as mimesis, not of the world of extra-linguistic 
phenomena but of another text, another entity of a linguistic order. 
The two metaphors are connected, because the trust that we, on this side of the 
language  barrier,  place  in  the  translator  as  mediator  and  enabler  depends  on  the quality, or the presumed quality, of the translation as likeness, as resemblance, as a 
truthful  portrait.  A  translation,  being  a  derived  product,  may  be  secondary  and 
therefore second-best, but because we trust the mediator’s integrity and good faith we 
assume that the replica is ‘as good as’ the real thing. The last thing we want to do is to 
bank on a forger or a counterfeiter. 
Yet this is exactly what we are doing. It is in the nature of translation. It is also 
what  makes  translation  worth  studying.  The  rather  smooth,  unruffled  picture  of 
translation that I have just painted has an ‘other’ to it, a more unsettling but also a 
much more interesting and intriguing side. The smooth, unruffled picture may be part 
of the conventional perception and self-presentation of translation, but it papers over 
the cracks. I want to try and poke my finger into at least  some of these cracks. And 
the reason for doing so lies in the recognition that translation, for all its presumed 
secondariness, derives its force from the fact that it is still our only answer to, and our 
only escape from, Babel. 
‘Translation’s Other’, then, comprises, among other things, the ambivalences and 
paradoxes, the hybridity and plurality of translation, its ‘otherness’ as ‘awkwardness’ 
if you like, in contrast to the perception of translation as replica or reproduction, as 
referring, simply and unproblematically (if always from an inferior position), to an 
original. But it also means the significance of translation as a cultural force, which 
belies the common view of it as mechanical and merely derivative, secondary, second-
hand, second-best, second-rate.
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Let me return for a moment to what I called the self-presentation of translation. This is 
the  kind  of  self-promotional  -  and  widely  accepted - image that resides in telling 
metaphors of  the type ‘Speaking through an interpreter, President Yeltsin declared 
that...’. What does it mean to say: ‘speaking through an interpreter’? Or take a variant: 
we all blithely claim that we have read Dostoyevsky and Dante and Douwes Dekker, 
and Kazantzakis and Kafka and Kundera. Hardly anyone, I trust, has read all of these 
in the original language. We have read some or most of them in translation, in the 
standard sense of ‘interlingual’ translation. To the extent that translation successfully 
manages to produce, or to project, a sense of equivalence, a sense of  transparency and 
trustworthiness entitling the translation to function as a full-scale representation and 
hence  as  a  reliable  substitute  for  a  source  text,  statements  like  ‘I  have  read 
Dostoyevsky’  etc.  are  a  legitimate  shorthand  for  saying  ‘I  have  actually  read  a 
translation of Dostoyevsky’ - which then amounts to saying ‘and this is practically as 
good  as  reading  the  original’.  But  note:  only  to  the  extent  that  a  ‘sense’  of 
equivalence, of equality in practical use value, has been produced. And we tend to 
believe  that  this  ‘sense’  of  equivalence  results  from  the  very  transparency  of  the 
translation as resemblance. A translation, we say, is at its most successful when its 
being a translation goes unnoticed, i.e. when it manages not to remind us that it is a 
translation. A translation most coincides with its original when it is most transparent, 
when it approximates pure resemblance. 
This requires that the translator’s labour be, as it were, negated, or sublimated, 
that all traces of the translator’s intervention in the text be erased. The irony is that 
those traces, those words, are all we have, they are all we have access to on this side 
of the language barrier. Yeltsin may well speak rightt ‘through’ an interpreter, but all 
we have to make sense of are the interpreter’s words. Nevertheless we say that Yeltsin 
stated  so-and-so,  that  we  have  read  Dostoyevsky.  Even  though  it  is  precisely this 
presumed authoritative originary voice that is absent, we casually state it is the only one that presents itself to us. 
We feel entitled to be casual about this because we construe translation as a form 
of delegated speech, a kind of speaking by proxy. This implies not only a consonance 
of voices, but also a hierarchical relationship between them, as well as a clear moral -
often  even  a  legal  -  imperative,  that  of  the  translator’s  non-interference.  The 
imperative has been formulated as the ‘honest spokesperson’ or the ‘true interpreter’ 
norm, which calls on the translator simply and accurately to re-state the original, the 
whole original and nothing but the original. In this view the model of translation is 
direct quotation: nothing omitted, nothing added, nothing changed - except, of course, 
the language.
The moment we stop to think about it, we realize we are entertaining an illusion. 
Even without invoking the problematics of a separation of signifier and signified or of 
a metaphysics of presence, we can appreciate that a translation will never coincide 
with  its  source.  Languages  and  cultures  are  not  symmetrical  or  even  isomorphic 
systems.  For  every  instance  of  consonance,  however  measured,  there  is  also 
dissonance. Not only the language changes with translation; so does the context, the 
intent, the function, the entire communicative situation. Since the translator’s inter-
vention in this process cannot simply be neutralized or erased without trace, a more 
appropriate model of translated discourse might be indirect speech rather than direct 
quotation,  if  only  because  indirect  speech  increases  distance  and  difference, 
acknowledges the likelihood of manipulation and misuse, and is generally messier in 
the  way  it  superimposes  and  intermingles  the  various  voices  that  make  up  its  re-
enunciation. It is difference and therefore opaqueness and untidiness that are inscribed 
in the operations of translation, not coincidence or transparency or equivalence in any 
formal sense. Speaking of translation in terms of equivalence means engaging in an 
elaborate - if socially necessary - act of make-believe.
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Various more or less philosophical and poststructuralist avenues open up here, but let 
me  focus  on  a  more  immediately  obvious  aspect:  the  question  of  the  translator’s 
supposed  non-interference,  which  translates  as  the  translator’s  invisibility  in  the 
translated text. My point is that translated texts - like other texts, only more so - are 
always,  inherently,  plural,  unstable,  de-centred,  hybrid.  The  ‘other’  voice,  the 
translator’s voice, is always there. But because of the way we have conventionally 
construed translation, we prefer, we even require this voice to remain totally discreet. 
In practice many translations try hard to comply with this requirement. Sometimes, 
however, translations run into what we might call ‘performative self-contradiction.’ 
The resulting incongruities that open up in the text are due to the fact that, while we 
generally accept that translated texts are reoriented towards a different type of reader 
in a different linguistic and cultural environment, we expect the agent, and hence the 
voice, that effected this reorientation to remain so discreet as to vanish altogether. 
That  is  not  always  possible,  and  then  the  translation  may  be  caught  blatantly 
contradicting  its  own  performance.  And  if  we  can  demonstrate  the  translator’s 
discursive  presence  in  those  cases,  we can postulate a translator’s voice, however 
indistinct, in all translations. Let me illustrate the point with a couple of instances 
where we can clearly discern other voices intruding into a discourse where they were 
not meant to be heard.
The first, utterly obvious example bears on what Roman Jakobson would call the 
metalinguistic function of language; Derrida speaks of language ‘re-marking’ itself in 
a  text  which  declares  that  it  is  in  a  certain  language.  In  translation  this  causes problems,  as  indeed  Derrida  has  shown  in  his  discussion  of  the  final  chapter  of 
Descartes’  Discours  de  la  méthode.  There  Descartes  says,  in  French,  that  he  has 
written his book not in Latin but in French. The Latin translation of the Discours
omits  this  embarrassing  sentence,  to  avoid  the  self-contradiction  of  a  statement 
declaring, in Latin, it is not in Latin but in French. Derrida regards this as an instance 
of institutional untranslatability, which is a perfectly valid observation, as indeed in 
the Latin version the sentence was not translated. For the reader of the Latin version, 
however, the omission is not immediately detectable because the statement is simply 
not  there.  In  translations  into  languages  other  than  Latin,  where  the  sentence  is
translated, the self-contradiction may be less glaring, but it is still obvious enough.
The Penguin version, for example, has: ‘And if I write in French ... rather than in 
Latin ... it is because ...'. The anomaly of reading an English text which declares, in 
English,  that  it  is  actually  in  French  creates  a  credibility  gap  which  readers  can 
overcome only be reminding themselves that this is, of course, a translation. But in so 
doing the reader also realizes that the voice producing the statement cannot possibly 
belong to Descartes, or to Descartes only. There is, clearly, another voice at work, a 
voice we are not meant to hear, which echoes and mimes the first voice, but never 
fully coincides with it. And that other voice is there in the text itself, in every word of 
it. 
Derrida himself has exploited this paradox of translation more than once in his 
own writings, on occasion even openly challenging his translators to find solutions to 
his insistent wordplay. Clearly, such solutions as are found are so charged with irony 
that  they  cannot  be  read  without  the  awareness  that  the  text  contains  another, 
intermittently  audible  voice  that  cannot  conceivably  be  reduced  to  Derrida’s.  And 
when  no  solution  is  found,  the  translated  text’s  manifest  helplessness  is  no  less 
revealing. In all these cases we can ask: whose words are we in fact reading? Exactly 
who is speaking? And if we are dealing with more voices than one, where do we 
locate them?
My other example concerns an instance of structural overdetermination in literary 
fiction. It comes from the Dutch novel Max Havelaar (1860) by Multatuli. This is an 
extraordinary novel in more than one respect. I want to pick out just a single short 
sentence from it, but it does involve the book’s entire structure. In its barest narrative 
essence Max Havelaar tells the story of a character called Max Havelaar and his wife 
Tine. Havelaar is a Dutch civil servant in the colonial administration of the Dutch 
East Indies in the 1850s. Witnessing the exploitation of the local population by the 
native  élite,  he  protests  in  vain  to  his  immediate  superior.  When  he  ignores  the 
administrative  hierarchy  and  brings  a  charge  against  the  corrupt  local  ruler,  he  is 
relieved of his post and resigns in disgust. This story is told as a novel within a novel. 
If we call the Havelaar story Novel B, we can call the framing story Novel A. This 
Novel A is set in Amsterdam, and concerns a penny-pinching, narrow-minded, self-
righteous bourgeois Dutch coffee broker. He has in his firm a young German trainee, 
who eventually becomes the main narrator of Novel B, the Havelaar story. In the 
book’s final pages both Novel A and Novel B are suddenly swept aside when a third 
narrator, Multatuli himself, intervenes with an openly political message in the form of 
a direct appeal to the Dutch king to stop the exploitation of the natives in the Dutch 
East  Indies. With this appeal Multatuli effectively transforms what had up to this 
point  presented  itself  to  us  as  a  novel  into  a  pamphlet.  However,  when  he  first 
introduces himself to the reader, Multatuli also translates his own name, ‘multa tuli’, 
‘I who have borne much’, leaving us in no doubt that the name on the title page is a 
pseudonym. To complicate matters further, the book’s dedication (in the manuscript 
and the first three editions) is to ‘E.H.v.W.’, later (in the fourth edition) expanded to ‘Everdine Huberte Baronness van Wynbergen, loyal wife etc.’ Taking into account 
nineteenth-century literary conventions, this leaves little doubt that the dedicatee is the 
wife of - well, not of a pseudonym, but presumably of the real-life author behind the 
pseudonym. We know from other sources that this indeed the case: the real-life writer 
of Max Havelaar is Eduard Douwes Dekker, who went through an experience in the 
Dutch East Indies not unlike that of the fictional character Max Havelaar.
Now, in the Havelaar story, i.e. in Novel B which is embedded in Novel A which 
amounts to a fictionalized front for the political pamphlet, there is at one point a 
conversation  between  the  character  Havelaar  and  his  wife  Tine.  During  this 
conversation  Tine  asks  her  husband  if  he  remembers  how  he  once  translated  her 
initials. In the English version, in which everything obviously happens in English, 
Havelaar replies: ‘E.H.V.W.: eigen haard veel waard’. To the English reader these 
words evidently make no sense at all. More importantly, the incongruity of suddenly 
reverting to Dutch in the middle of a book that is meant to be in English, jolts us out 
of any willing suspension of disbelief, reminding us not only that we are reading a 
translation  but  also  that  there  is  another  voice  speaking  here,  a  voice  that  cannot 
possibly be identical with any one of the various narrators deployed in the book. 
The reason for the desperate lapse into Dutch in the English translation is a matter 
of overdetermination. The initials of Havelaar’s wife, E.H.V.W., are identical to those 
of  the book’s dedicatee, who, beyond the pseudonym, is the real author’s real wife. 
Havelaar is Multatuli is Eduard Douwes Dekker. Just as, in transforming itself from 
novel into pamphlet, the book as a whole ‘leaps out of literature into reality’, so the 
initials of a fictional character in the novel are tied to those of a real-life person. That 
is why they cannot be changed. And since in translating those initials Havelaar makes 
them into a pre-formed, fixed phrase - a common proverb - in which the first letters of 
each word repeat the initials (E.H.V.W.: ‘eigen haard veel waard’, ‘there’s no place 
like home’), the translation short-circuits and reverts back to Dutch. In doing so it also 
explodes  its  own  make-believe,  and  exposes  this  ‘other’  voice  that  has  been 
superimposed on the voices of the various fictional narrators - and that we, as readers, 
were supposed to ignore.
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What is at stake in texts like these is more than a matter of plural, unstable, de-centred 
narrative  voices.    The  question  of  voice  points  to  a  much  broader  issue,  that  of 
translation as a cultural and therefore also as an ideological construct. This takes us 
back to the standard perception of translation as transparency and as duplication, as 
not only consonant but as coinciding with its original. It requires that translators too 
become transparent, that they spirit themselves away in the interests of the source 
text’s  integrity  and  status.  Only  the  translator  who  operates  with  self-effacing 
discretion and deference can be trusted not to violate the original. The loyal self-
abnegation of the one guarantees the undisputed primacy of the other. 
Historically the hierarchical positioning of originals versus translations has been 
expressed in terms of stereotyped oppositions such as those between creative versus 
derivative  work,  primary  versus  secondary,  art  versus  craft,  authority  versus 
obedience, freedom versus constraint, speaking in one’s own name versus speaking 
for someone else. In each instance, of course, it is translation which is circumscribed, 
subordinated, contained, controlled. And in case we should imagine that these are 
after  all  natural  and  necessary  hierarchies,  it  will  be  useful  to  remember  that  our 
culture  has  often  construed  gender  distinctions  in  terms  of  strikingly  similar 
oppositions of creative versus reproductive, original versus derivative, active versus passive, dominant versus subservient. The point here is not just that the historical 
discourse about translation is sexist in casting translation in the role of maidservant or 
faithful  and subservient wife, but that translation has been hedged in by means of 
ideological  hierarchies  reminiscent  of  those  employed  to  maintain  sexual  power 
relations.
There is more. Ever since literary theory began to emphasize the role of the reader 
in  investing  texts  with  meaning,  and  the  role  of  convention  and  the  play  of 
intertextuality in the production of texts that are but variations on existing patterns 
and texts, we have come to appreciate, on the one hand, the  inexhaustibility and 
irrepressibility of meaning and, on the other, the various mechanisms by which our 
culture nevertheless attempts to control meaning. In Michel Foucault’s notion of the 
‘author function’, as he explains it in the essay ‘What is an Author?’, these two come 
together: the ‘author function’ is the ideological figure that we devise to keep the free 
circulation  of  meaning  within  bounds.  We  do  this  primarily  by  positing  a  single 
unifying subject, with a single voice, behind the text. We thus suppress the more 
uncontrollable  aspects  of  texts,  their  loose  ends,  their  gaps,  their  unintended  or 
unattributable    features,  their  plurality  and  heterogeneity.  Translation  further 
compounds  and  intensifies  this  refractory  growth.  Translations  temporarily  fix 
interpretations  which,  as  verbal  constructs,  are  themselves  open  to  interpretation. 
They transform ‘originals’ which are themselves transformations of texts which are 
themselves  transformations  -  etc.  They  increase  the  plurivocality  of  already plural 
texts. If, therefore, our culture needs an ‘author function’ to circumscribe the semantic 
potential and plurality of texts, it is not hard to see why it has also, emphatically, 
created a ‘translator function’ to contain the exponential increase in signification and 
plurivocality  which  translation  brings  about.  As  an  ideological  and  historical 
construct,  the  ‘translator  function’  serves  to  keep  translation  in  a  safe  place,  in  a 
hierarchical order. The  metaphors and oppositions through which translation defines 
itself, the expectations and attitudes we bring to translated texts, the legal constraints 
under which translation operates, all accord with this function. And so we say we read 
Dostoyevsky,  or  Multatuli.  Just  as  we  accept  that  the  safest  translation  is  an 
‘authorized’ translation, formally and legally approved by the author. The term itself 
confirms the singularity of intent, the coincidence of voice, the illusion of equivalence 
and, of course, the unmistakable relation of power and authority. 
This  line  of  thought  has  radical  and  far-reaching  consequences,  which  current 
approaches to translation are only beginning to explore. Let me therefore take a step 
back, and return to the notion of translation as transmission and mediation. Here too it 
is  a  matter  of  discerning  other  aspects  of  translation  than  those  highlighted  by 
translation’s  traditional  self-image.  What  I  want  to  focus  on  is  the  element  of 
disjunction  and  difference,  not  just  in  actual  translations  but  also  in  ideas  about 
translation and the use made of translation in a social and historical context.
As we know, all texts require some frame of reference shared between source and 
receiver to be able to function as vehicles for communication. The various forms of 
linguistic, temporal and geographical displacement that translation brings about, also 
dislocate this shared environment. Of course, we all recognize that in translating, in 
recasting and re-packaging a source text for a new recipient in a different cultural 
circuit,  a  form  of  alteration  and  adjustment,  and  hence  a  degree  of  manipulation, 
invariably takes place. It is not only the fact itself of this dislocation that is of interest. 
At least as interesting is its social and historical conditioning, the particular ways in 
which  translation,  as  different  communities  have  construed  it  at  different  times, 
transforms its primary material. In the study of translation the interesting question is 
not whether a text has been transmitted more or less intact. What is of interest is the nature of the changes that have been wrought, and why certain changes were wrought 
and not others.
What I mean is this. In translating, i.e. in rewriting, transforming, appropriating 
and relocating a given source text, the translator attunes the resulting entity to a new 
communicative situation. Just how much and what kind of attuning and adaptation is 
permitted or acceptable, will depend on prevailing concepts of translation in the host 
culture and on who has the power to impose them. To the extent that translation, or 
the  ‘translator  function’,  is  construed  as  a  re-enunciation  of  an  existing  text,  the 
practice of translation inevitably results in all manner of tensions within the translated 
text, quite apart from the fact that it makes translations into very hybrid things which 
‘signify’ much in the way other texts signify but in addition entertain an emphatic 
relation to another text in another language. 
At the same time, translations cannot help being enmeshed in the discursive forms 
of the recipient culture, including the whole array of modes which a culture may have 
developed to represent anterior and differently coded discourses. Translation - like 
adaptation, pastiche, commentary, remake, parody, plagiarism, etc. - is one mode of 
textual recycling among others. The specific, and always historically determinate way 
in which a cultural community construes translation therefore also determines the way 
in which translation, as a cultural product, refers to its donor text, the kind of image of 
the original which the translation projects or holds up. In other words, the ‘other’ to 
which a translated text refers is never simply the source text, even though that is, of 
course, the claim which translations commonly make. It is at best an image of it - a 
mirror  image  perhaps,  provided  we  think  of  it  as  an  image  reflected  in  a 
kaleidoscopic,  distorting  mirror.  Because  the  image  is  always  distorted,  never 
innocent,  we  can  say  that  translation  constructs  or  produces  or,  one  step  further, 
‘invents’ its original.
It is reasonable to assume, moreover, that translations are also made in response to 
or in anticipation of demands and needs of the recipient culture. If this is the case, 
then the selection of texts to be translated, the mode that is chosen to (re)present or 
project  or  invent  the  source  text,  the  manner  in  which  translation  generally  is 
circumscribed and regulated at a particular historical moment, and the way in which 
individual translations are received, all this tells us a great deal about that cultural 
community.  What  exactly  does  it  tell  us?  To  my  mind,  translation  provides  a 
privileged  index  of  cultural  self-reference,  or,  if  you  prefer,  self-definition.  In 
reflecting about itself, a culture, or a section of it,  tends to define its own identity in 
terms of ‘self’ and ‘other’, i.e. in relation to that which it perceives as different from 
itself, that which lies outside the boundary of its own sphere of operations, outside its 
own  ‘system’.  Translation  offers  a  window  on  cultural  self-definition  in  that  it 
involves not only the selection and importation of cultural goods from the outside 
world, but at the same time, in the same breath as it were, their transformation into 
terms which the recipient culture recognizes, to some extent at least, as its own. And 
because the history of translation leaves in its wake a large number of dual texts as 
well as countless re-translations and reworkings of existing translations, it provides us 
with a uniquely accessible series of cultural constructions of the ‘other’, and therefore 
with privileged, first-hand evidence of the workings of cultural self-definition. In this 
perspective,  clearly,  resistance  or  indifference  to  translation,  even  the  absence  of 
translation, can be as informative as the enthusiastic pursuit of this or that particular 
type of translation - and it is important to remember that when translation occurs it is 
always a particular type of translation. Translators never ‘just translate’. They translate 
in the context of certain conceptions of and expectations about translation. Within this 
context they make choices and take up positions because they have goals to reach, interests to pursue, material and symbolic stakes to defend. Both the context and the 
actions of individuals and groups are socially determined. Translators too are social 
agents.
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In short, where a culture feels the need or sees an opportunity to import texts from 
beyond a language barrier, and to do so by means of translation, we can learn a great 
deal from looking closely at such things as: what is selected for translation from the 
range  of  potentially  available  texts,  and  who  makes  the  relevant  decisions;  who 
produces  the  translations,  under  what  conditions,  for  whom,  with  what  effect  or 
impact; what form the translations take, i.e. what choices have been made in relation 
to existing expectations and practices in the same discursive field and in comparable 
fields; who speaks about translation, in what terms and with what authority.
This obviously involves much more than can be illustrated adequately here. Let 
me  nevertheless  pick  up  a  couple  of  points  bearing  on  translation  in  a  particular 
historical configuration, the Low Countries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
This  is  the  period  which  sees  not  only  the  breakthrough  of  the  Reformation  and 
Renaissance, but also, in the seventeenth century, the rise, greatness and impending 
fall of the Dutch Republic. The manner in which translation is viewed, the character 
of  the  translations  themselves,  and  the  uses  made  of  them,  take  us  right  into  the 
cultural self-perception of the period.
A few historical moments will have to suffice here. We may begin in Antwerp, 
which was the economic and cultural heart of the Low Countries around the mid-
sixteenth  century.  Here  the  rhetorician  Cornelis  van  Ghistele,  who  gave  Dutch 
renaissance  writing  its  first  substantial  boost  with  a  series  of  renderings  from  the 
Classics, translated for a specific audience and with a specific aim, and therefore in a 
specific mode. His readership consisted of those wealthy merchants and patricians 
who had limited school Latin at best, but an active interest in the new prestige culture 
and money to buy well-designed, expensive books. For them Van Ghistele translated 
the canonical names known from the Latin schools: Virgil, Ovid, Horace, Terence. In 
his prefaces and in his practice as a translator he did everything he could to bring the 
foreign authors to his audience, employing a common verse form, using the prestige 
of the Ancients to enhance the status of modern dramatic forms, writing his own 
sequels to demonstrate the potential of the classical genres, etc. The one translation in 
which he did not steer this course proved to be a commercial failure. Van Ghistele 
appealed  to  his  readers’  self-esteem  by  writing  contemptuously  about  popular 
chapbooks  that  contained  mere  entertainment,  trivialized  Ovid  as  no  more  than  a 
fantastic story-teller or still presented Virgil in the medieval manner as some kind of 
sorcerer, while also, at the other end of the cultural spectrum, voicing disapproval of 
the élitism of those intellectually highbrow Humanist circles who made exclusive use 
of Latin. Van Ghistele’s vernacular translations consistently carried cross-references 
to the Latin texts, and he produced literary work in both Dutch and Latin himself.
Whereas Van Ghistele provided his readers with the means to increase what Pierre 
Bourdieu  would  call  their  ‘cultural  capital’  by  supplying  them  with  fashionable 
prestige goods, the other major translator of the period, D.V. Coornhert, who lived 
mostly in Holland, took up writers like Boethius, Cicero and Seneca in the context of 
a conception of poetry as moral instruction, with the help of classical rhetoric and a 
keen regard for the quality of the vernacular. When he was in his thirties, and before 
he knew any Latin, Coornhert rewrote an existing Flemish version of Boethius’ De 
consolatione philosophiae, adapting it to Northern Dutch usage. Clearly, the exactness of the translation as translation was not his main concern, although he was to translate 
Boethius  ‘properly’  thirty  years  later.  When  Coornhert  picked  up  Seneca,  he 
characteristically chose De beneficiis for translation; from Cicero’s works he selected 
De officiis. Coornhert, an intellectual streetfighter to whom Calvin once referred as a 
‘raving dog’ because of his relentless advocacy of religious tolerance at a time when 
this was not a universally popular line to take, also emerged in the 1580s as the author 
of the first book on ethics written in Dutch, and he was closely associated with the 
first Dutch handbooks on the trivium (i.e. covering grammar, dialectic and rhetoric). 
Since these subjects, and for that matter subjects like mathematics, law, medicine, etc. 
had  until  then  only  been  dealt  with  in  Latin,  vernacular  writing  covering  these 
domains employed a systematic policy of translating technical terms from the Latin. 
Coornhert’s translations play a formative part in this wide-ranging and self-conscious 
cultural-political project too.
Just how central a part was assigned to translation in the formation of a Dutch 
national culture around the turn of the century may be gleaned from some poems by 
the well-known painter, poet and art historian Karel van Mander. Among other things, 
Van Mander translated Virgil’s Bucolics and Georgics ‘in the French manner’, i.e. 
into metrical verse. The book appeared in Haarlem in 1597. There is a unique copy of 
this edition (now in the University Library in Ghent) which has an extra quire at the 
back,  containing  nine  poems  by  Van  Mander  in  which  he  calls  on  a  range  of 
prominent literary and public figures to follow his example and translate the Classics 
as a service to the nation and as proof of cultural proficiency, in the firm belief  that 
painters as well as poets need to be familiar with the Ancients (he went on to write an 
extensive  interpretation  of  Ovid’s  Metamorphoses,  with  the  relevant  iconography 
attached, and to translate the Iliad into alexandrines, via a French version) - and in a 
language, incidentally, which Van Mander, being a Flemish refugee himself, strongly 
preferred should continue to be called ‘Flemish’; but that, as we know, was a lost 
cause.
Van Mander’s programme would actually be carried out in the following decades, 
most notably by Joost van den Vondel, the ‘prince of poets’ and the major tragic 
playwright of the Dutch Golden Age. Vondel translated prodigiously from a range of 
languages  in  a  lifelong  search  for  literary  examples  and  models.  Here  ‘translatio’ 
starts as personal ‘exercitatio’, matures into ‘imitatio’ and ‘aemulatio’, and at every 
stage informs a type of ‘inventio’ that seeks to extend and enrich both a national and a 
supra-national tradition in the vernacular. That is also why translation occurs in so 
many different forms, and is so closely and consistently allied with imitation.
That this is true not just of Vondel’s own production but of the increasingly self-
confident literary culture of the mid-seventeenth-century Dutch Republic generally, 
may  be  illustrated  ex  negativo  with  reference  to  the  West  Flemish  catholic  priest 
Adrianus de Buck, a now forgotten figure whose translation of Boethius’ Consolation 
of Philosophy appeared in Bruges, i.e. in the Southern Netherlands then still under 
Spanish rule,  in 1653. The book has come down to us in a mere two copies. De 
Buck’s preface leaves the reader in no doubt that he is green with envy at the miracle 
of Dutch culture in the Northern Netherlands, not least because, he observes, they 
have  appropriated  the  learning  of  every  other  language  in  the  world,  including 
Hebrew,  Turkish  and  Arabic.  De  Buck  is  acutely  aware  of  living  in  what,  by 
comparison with the Northern republic, is rapidly becoming a cultural backwater, and 
one which has already felt the effects of France’s expansionism (the town of Veurne, 
where De Buck was living, had been overrun by French troops a few years earlier). 
And so he translates Boethius, partly to offer consolation to his compatriots who have 
suffered  at  the  hands  of  the  French,  partly  because  he  thinks  (mistakenly,  as  it happens) that the Protestant heretics in the North had left Boethius untranslated on 
account of the references to free will and to purgatory in the Consolation, and partly 
because he wants to prove that, as he puts it, ‘the sun also shines on our West Flemish 
land and that there is fire in our souls too’. This is presumably the reason why in his 
translation  he  renders  every  one of the poems in Boethius twice, in two different 
metres. Through his decision to translate, through his selection of a particular text to 
translate, and through opting for a particular mode of translating, De Buck offers us a 
cultural  self-definition,  a  positioning  which  is  religious  and  political  as  well  as 
cultural and, more narrowly, literary.
The cultural self-confidence of the Dutch Republic, meanwhile, was such that the 
beneficial role of translation was no longer entirely taken for granted. In the 1650s and 
‘60s dissonant views regarding the need for and the value of translation began to be 
voiced. But the denigration of translation typically came from individuals or circles 
not directly associated with the more canonical, classicizing genres. They asserted 
emphatically the primacy of ‘inventio’ over all manner of ‘imitatio’. But they could 
not capture the centre ground of cultural politics. It may even be symptomatic that for 
all  its  apparent  self-confidence  the  Republic  did  not  simultaneously  develop  an 
equivalent  to  the  so-called  ‘belles  infidèles’  translations  which  were  appearing  in 
France from the 1630s onwards, and which were marked by the kind of sovereign 
appropriation of the ‘other’ which invites comparison with the expansionist policies 
France would adopt in other domains in the seventeenth century. We know that some 
Dutch  writers  at  least  were  aware  of  how  high-prestige  cultural  translation  was 
developing  in  France.  The  very  first  occurrence  of  the  term  ‘belles  infidèles’  in 
writing, anywhere, is in a letter of 12 March1666 by Constantijn Huygens - a Latin 
letter, so the term, appropriately, is first attested in translation. For all his polyglot 
virtuosity,  however,  Huygens  himself  subscribed  to  a  much  stricter  view  of 
translation, as did Vondel. The views and example of these two prominent men of 
letters served as a point of reference for most other translators, as by now a local 
translational tradition had established itself.
As French cultural hegemony began to assert itself all over Europe, the calls for 
originality  in  Dutch  letters  were  drowned,  roughly  around  the  time  when  the 
Republic’s international power and prestige also began to wane. At the end of the 
1660s  we  encounter  sharply  opposing  views  on  translation.  On  one  side  were 
playwrights  like  Jan  Vos,  Joan  Blasius  and  Thomas  Asselijn,  who  wrote  non-
Classicizing,  action-filled,  often  politically  motivated  cloak-and-dagger  plays,  and 
who loudly declared that no amount of translating or imitating can bestow lasting 
fame. They were vigorously opposed by the newly formed French-Classicist society 
‘Nil  Volentibus  Arduum’,  whose  members  were  busily  importing  French  models, 
fine-tuning  these,  whenever  necessary,  to  the  immutable  rules  of  reason  and  art, 
subjecting  existing  translations  to  ruthless  criticism  and  revision,  and  even 
deliberately  producing  rival  translations  to  prevent  other  people’s  versions  being 
staged. One of the leading lights of this society, Andries Pels, criticized Rembrandt 
for following nature and his own inclination rather than the rules of art and reason. In 
their translations too the ‘Nil’ members put into practice the idea that ‘there is greater 
achievement in improving a poorly written play while translating it than in writing a 
completely new one.’ There was, in other words, a fierce struggle for cultural power 
and legitimacy going on here, and translation - a certain kind of translation, of certain 
kinds of source texts - was one of the main stakes as well as the principal weapon.
The  Neo-Classicisists  won  decisively,  and  went  on  to  control  the  Amsterdam
theatre for decades to come. Of the ten new plays staged in Amsterdam during the 
1678 season, six issued from the ‘Nil’ circle; four of these were translations produced at some speed by ‘Nil’ with the express aim of combating rival versions. Translated 
plays continued to outnumber ‘original’ Dutch works in the Amsterdam theatre until 
the 1770s. In the eighteenth century a similar situation prevailed with respect to prose 
fiction, and especially popular prose. This helps us to understand how it came about 
that when in 1782 there appeared the epistolary novel Sara Burgerhart by Betje Wolff 
and Aagje Deken, now generally regarded as the first modern novel in Dutch, its title 
page bore the proud inscription ‘Not Translated’ - an extraordinary statement, the 
significance of which has hardly been appreciated in Dutch literary historiography.
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Different but not fundamentally dissimilar pictures could be painted for other periods 
and for cultures other than Dutch, in fact for all periods and all cultures. Even when 
contemporary  Anglo-American  culture  translates  notoriously  little  from  foreign 
languages, historically it owes as much to translation as any other. Moreover, as I 
indicated  earlier,  resistance  or  hostility  or  indifference  to  translation  in  particular 
periods has its own significance for cultural self-definition. 
If we reckon, then, that translation, together with the various practices lying in its 
immediate vicinity, are worth serious and sustained attention, both on account of the 
complexity of the phenomenon itself and in view of its cultural interest, it is also 
worth  assessing  the  precise  weight  and  import  of  the  concepts  that  govern  this 
practice, and exploring its modalities and parameters. This involves delving into the 
question of  what exactly, in different periods and contexts, is covered by the various 
terms  and  concepts,  the  images  and  metaphors  used  to  conceptualize  and  locate 
translation. It means, more broadly, investigating not only the practice of translation 
and the various factors that govern it, but also the discourse about translation, i.e. its 
historical, and historically unstable, self-description. A single, brief illustration will 
have to do here. The characterization of translation in pictorial terms is one instance 
which involves reading the historical metaphors. Comparing translation to the activity 
of  apprentice  painters  copying  the  works  of  the  masters, for example, has been a 
means of highlighting  any one of a range of aspects of translation, including its role 
as an exercise for the aspiring poet; its social usefulness as the provision of a readily 
accessible if imperfect copy of an inaccessible original (and a poor copy is better than 
none); its qualitative inferiority vis-à-vis the model, since, as Quintilian says, the copy 
is necessarily inferior to that which it copies; its affinity with imitation, both being 
forms  of  homage  to  an  acknowledged  master;  its  nature  as  a  form  of  secondary 
mimesis, an imitation of a work which is itself thought of as an imitation of nature; its 
difficulty, since the translator’s palette of words is necessarily different from that of 
his or her model; its double referentiality, as a statement in its own right and as a re-
statement of an existing utterance. Which of these senses is activated or exploited, 
when, by whom, in preference to which other available metaphors, for what purpose?
The patient tracing and detailing of these self-descriptions is often our only way of 
assessing how translation was conceptualized in the past. It also provides an insight 
into our current discourse about translation, which after all translates ‘translation’ by 
means  of  comparable  concepts  and  metaphors.  Are  not  all  our  theories  of  an 
essentially metaphorical nature?
There is much to be unearthed, pieced together and interpreted here, partly at least 
because  traditionally  the  material  -  actual  translations  as  well  as  the  poetics  of 
translation  -  has  received  scant  attention  in  literary  and  cultural  histories  written 
mostly along monolingual lines, inspired by a post-Romantic concept of originality, 
and centred on canonical works and authors. But the climate has clearly begun to change. The renewed emphasis in literary historiography on the social context and the 
institutional structures in which literature operates, has created room for the study of 
hitherto marginalized but socially as well as intellectually relevant phenomena such as 
translation. At least as important has been the ceaseless questioning of just about all 
the  traditional  key  concepts  of  literary  study  by  one  branch  or  another  of  recent 
literary  theory.  As  such  seemingly  homogenous  notions  as  the  ‘author’  or  the 
‘original’ were dismantled, the interest in hybrid, self-referential, ironic, intertextual 
forms grew. And finally there is the fact that in recent decades the study of translation 
itself has significantly broadened its scope by breaking out of its applied, prescriptive, 
ancillary  mould  to  engage in various kinds of theoretical, empirical and historical 
research. Instead of contributing to the containment of translation in the straitjacket of 
identity  and  reproduction,  these  bolder  experiments    have  brought  to  the  fore  the 
irrepressible  plurality  of  translation  in  all  its  weird  and  wonderful  historical 
manifestations. For my own approach over the years, both the theoretical speculation 
and the descriptive and historicizing  work of researchers like Gideon Toury, José 
Lambert and André Lefevere, to name only these, proved particularly inspiring.
The kind of work I do, then, is intended to contribute to a renewed understanding 
of translation, both as an historical phenomenon and a cultural construct. That, even 
on those occasions when the focus is on Dutch-language texts, it is done from an 
essentially  comparative  perspective  is  not  only  inevitable,  given  the  nature  of  the 
material, but also entirely appropriate in view of what George Steiner, speaking in 
Oxford  just  eighteen  months  or  so  ago,  called  the  ‘primacy  of  the  matter  of 
translation’ in comparative literary studies. 
Recognizing the primacy of the matter of translation is one thing, the methodology 
of studying translation is something else. Considering the complexity and the hybrid, 
plural,  untidy  nature  of  translation  it  is  not  surprising  that  a  wide  range  of 
methodologies  are  currently  being  applied.  My  own    attempts  to  understand 
translation as a communicative act and hence as a form of social behaviour, as an 
historical and culture-specific construct, as a cross-border activity involving different 
cultural communities, have prompted reckless but nevertheless personally rewarding 
forays into sociology and cultural anthropology as well as literary theory and modern 
systems  theory  -  the  distinctions  between  these  various  disciplines  are  often, 
mercifully, blurred. Translation, as an intellectual category and a socially active force, 
is not the kind of subject that can be reduced to or captured by a single disciplinary 
approach.
But I should not end this lecture with a methodological disquisition that can be of 
interest to devotees only. Something more paradoxical, another untidy ‘other’, this 
time at the meta-level of translation, will be more appropriate by way of conclusion. 
To appreciate it, we need to go back for a moment to Roman Jakobson’s short but 
influential  essay  ‘On  Linguistic  Aspects  of  Translation’  of  1959.  Here  Jakobson 
famously  distinguished  between  three  kinds  of  translation.  They  were,  firstly, 
‘intralingual translation, or rewording’, defined as the interpretation of verbal signs by 
means of other signs of the same language; secondly,  ‘interlingual translation, or 
translation  proper’,  i.e.  the  interpretation  of  verbal  signs  by  means  of  some  other 
language; and thirdly, ‘intersemiotic translation, or transmutation’, the interpretation 
of verbal signs by means of nonverbal sign systems.
Derrida has astutely commented on this tripartite division, pointing out that if for 
Jakobson intralingual translation is a form of translation, then in the essay itself the 
term ‘rewording’ is a translation of the term ‘intralingual translation’. In this way the 
first  and  the  third  term  in  the  list  are  both  translated  intralingually:  ‘intralingual 
translation’ is rendered as ‘rewording’, and ‘intersemiotic translation’ is reworded as ‘transmutation’.  But  in  the  middle  term,  ‘interlingual  translation,  or  translation 
proper’, the word ‘translation’ is not reworded or intralingually translated. It is merely 
repeated, tautologically restated. This form of translation is translation: ‘interlingual 
translation’  is  ‘translation  proper’.  The  addition  of  the  qualifier  ‘proper’  suggests 
moreover that the other two are somehow not ‘properly’ translation. This, it will be 
appreciated, undermines the whole exercise of ranging them all three together as so 
many kinds of translation.
From  there  Derrida  went  on  to  question  the  apparent  transparency  and 
homogeneity of notions like translation, language, etc. I am interested in the more 
pedestrian question why the paradox is there in the first place. The answer, it seems to 
me, lies in the recognition that Jakobson’s essay is anchored in at least two different 
fields.  As  a  linguistic  or,  more  properly,  a  semiotic  statement,  the  claim  that 
‘rewording’  and  ‘transmutation’  constitute  forms  of  translation,  is  perfectly 
acceptable. From the point of view of someone professionally engaged in the study of 
sign systems there is no good reason to restrict the study of translational phenomena 
to interlingual translation, to the exclusion of  intralingual, intersemiotic or for that 
matter intrasemiotic forms.
But seen from the vantage point of translation as it is commonly understood, or 
better, as it is socially construed, legitimated and institutionalized, the move is not 
permissible because there translation is translation proper, and only that. The unease 
in  Jakobson’s  formulation  stems  from  ambivalence  and  transgression  in  declaring 
both that translation properly understood means interlingual translation only and that 
translation  encompasses  other,  comparable  operations  not  conventionally,  or 
normally,    covered  by  the  term  ‘translation’.  Looking  at  the  essay  from  today’s 
vantage point, we can also appreciate it both as being part of the self-description and 
self-reflexiveness of translation, in questioning precisely the boundaries of the field 
and thus engaging in the discussion about what is and what is not translation, what 
falls  inside  or  outside,  and  as  being  part  of  an  emerging  academic  discipline  of 
translation studies.
What  the  example  shows  above  all  is  that,  like  other  branches  of  the  human 
sciences  which  cannot  escape  entanglement  in  the  object  they  describe,  so  the 
discourse  about  translation,  too,  -  including  the  academic  discourse,  including  the 
present  discourse  -  translates  concepts  and  practices  of  ‘translation’  into  its  own 
terms. And it necessarily does so on the basis of a certain concept of translation. In 
thus performing the very operations it attempts to describe, it is implicated in the self-
description of translation as a cultural construct, a social institution. In that sense the 
historical reflection on translation by practitioners and critics in the field, from Saint 
Jerome to the present, cannot be separated from the modern metalanguage employed 
in the research on translation. However much translation studies today may want, self-
consciously, to mark the distance between object-level and meta-level and to stress 
the orientation of its scholarly discourse to other discursive series, the complicity is 
always there, and it contributes in its turn to the social and cultural construction of 
translation as well as to the elaboration of an academic discipline. 
In a way, though, this is merely to confirm that our knowledge about translation is 
itself culture-bound. This, of course, we knew all along. The issue becomes acute as 
soon as we move beyond our immediate horizon, a move hard to avoid when dealing 
with translation. The problem surfaces whenever we wish to speak about ‘translation’ 
generally, as a transcultural or immanent or possibly even a universal given, or when 
we attempt to grasp what another culture, whether distant from us in time or place, 
means by whatever terms they use to denote an activity or a product that appears to 
translate as our ‘translation’ - which implies that we translate according to our concept of translation, and into our concept of translation. If this is the case, then the ‘other’ 
which our terms, as translations of the ‘other’, hold up to our view, will definitely not 
constitute a transparent image or a faithful representation. As we saw, translation is 
never  diaphanous,  it  is  never  innocent  or  pure,  never  without  its  own  distinct  or 
indistinct  voices  and  discursive  resonances.  On  the  contrary,  it  transforms  and 
dislocates everything within its grasp. To the extent, then, that our understanding of 
another culture’s concept of translation amounts to a translation of that concept, it is 
subject to all the distortions and all the untidy pluralization that goes with translation. 
Moreover, as we also saw, the nature and the particular slant of the distortion is itself 
socially conditioned and hence significant for what it tells us about the individuals and 
the communities performing the translative operation, i.e. about ourselves as students 
of  translation.  The  study  of  translation  rebounds  on  our  own  categories  and 
assumptions, our own modes of translating translation.
For those of us who take the study of translation seriously, there is no easy way 
out of these predicaments. But we can learn from them. The awareness of the pitfalls 
and the self-reflexiveness of ‘cultural translation’, as some ethnographers and cultural 
anthropologists call it, will not make the problems go away, but it can guard against a 
form  of  rashness  that  ignores  its  own  ethnocentricity  and  blindly,  reductively, 
translates  all  translation  into  ‘our’  translation,  instead  of  patiently,  deliberately, 
laboriously  negotiating  the  other’s  terrain  while  simultaneously  trying  to 
reconceptualize our own modes of representation through translation. 
Translation’s  other,  therefore,  is  not  only  the  hybridity  and  awkwardness  of 
translation as a discursive and representational form. It is not only the significance of 
translation as a force in cultural history and as an index of cultural self-definition. It is 
also  the  untidiness  of  our  disciplinary  translation  of  translation.  But  provided  we 
approach these various transgressions cautiously, critically, and self-critically, we may 
still, with luck, gain some insight into the perplexing otherness of translation itself as 
well as of the attempts, historical and contemporary, to account for it.
NOTES